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Director of

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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Advance Continues	3
(Information as of 23	300 EDT)
Israeli forces yesterday continued tions to the Beirut area, moving deeper north of the Beirut-Damascus highway. The exchanges of fire between Israeli and PLO	into Phalange-held territory here were <u>only scatt</u> ered
	There is
no information to confirm press re Arafat has sought refuge in a fore	eports that PLO leader eign embassy.//
There were late indications talso moving east toward Ras al Matbeen occupied by Syrian troops and Syrian units were said to be withdof the Israeli advance.	n, an area that has I their Lebanese allies.
Comment: If confirmed, this ably designed to force the Syrians contiguous to Phalange territory at the Bekaa Valley.	out of Christian areas
Lebanese Internal Developments	
Lebanese President Sarkis negotith Prime Minister Wazzan and seven Sunday to form a "Committee of representing all major sects as the rament. The committee is to inclainister Butrus, Shia militia lead leader Walid Junblat and Phalange The committee failed to meet yeste Barri refused to participate.	reral cabinet members National Salvation" Le basis for a new gov- Lude Wazzan, Foreign Ler Nabih Barri, Druze Leader Bashir Jumayyil.
	he committee can oversee

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Comment: Syrian forces in Lebanon	would be at a
serious disadvantage if they attempt to	confront the
Israelis. Syrian units in the Bekaa Val	ley were signiti-
cantly weakened in the fighting last week units moving into Lebanon from the border	k, and Syrian r area could be
quickly neutralized by Israeli airpower.	urca osara zo
quickly houselelles by least and i	
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Arab Reaction		
Arab leaders remain uncertain about Lebanon and the effect the crisis will ha Middle Eastern questions. Reporting cont growing popular hostility toward the US fregard as its collusion with Israel.	ave on broatinues to	ader indicate
Some Arab moderates derived private satisfaction from the set on the Syrians and the PLO, and see poten stability in Lebanon if the situation is	backs inf	improved
Economic Impact in Israel		
Israel announced three new taxes on raise about \$650 million to cover the cosinvasion. The most important of these "PTaxes" is an increase in the value-added to 15 percent expected to bring in an addition. A 2-percent tax on stock market tracely on Israelis traveling abroad was	st of the Deace for (tax from Ditional \$5 tansactions	Lebanese Galilee 12 percent 500 mil- s and a
Although Finance Minister Aridor sai now much the war has cost, opposition Lab out the cost for the first week between \$ \$700 million. Industrialists have report drop in output because of the reserve cal exchange is closed for two days to prepar work imposed by the new tax.	oor Party of 600 million ted a signification. The	officials on and ificant e stock
Comment: The increase in the value- increase Israel's inflationalready runn rate of 136 percent. The impact of the r will be mitigated to the extent that many had recently completed their compulsory m have been unable to find jobs. Export re reported to be downcould be further red the lower production.	ing at an reserve cally reservist ailitary seceiptsal	annual llup ts who ervice lready
sne rewer production.	Top Secret	

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UK-ARGENTINA: Surrender at Stanley Imminent	1
(Information as of 2300 EDT)	
A temporary cease-fire was arranged yesterday at Stanley after British forces made major gains. Argentina appears ready to surrender the Stanley garrison, but Britain probably will demand the surrender of all Argentine troops in East and West Falkland.	25X1 25X1
Menendez, the Argentine commander of the Falklands, had been ordered to negotiate a surrender. The Argentine press reported he was instructed to enter into talks with his British counterpart "as long as the honor of the Argentine armed forces is not affected." Press accounts of the British attack yesterday described Argentine troops "streaming" back toward Stanley after the fall of perimeter defensive positions.	25X1 25X1 25X1
Comment: The British forces apparently seized most of the remaining positions outside Stanley yesterday, including Mount William, Tumbledown Mountain and Wireless Ridge. This would leave the British in control of all the high ground around Stanley. If the Argentine troops abandoned their prepared positions and retreated toward Stanley in confusion, their commander would have had little choice but to ask for a cease-fire, since his routed forces would be open to artillery and air attacks.	25X1
UK Domestic Front	25 X 1
Prime Minister Thatcher yesterday told the House of Commons that talks were in progress between General Menendez and British General Waltersdeputy to British ground commander General Moorefor the surrender of East and West Falkland Islands. Spokesmen for all opposition parties congratulated the government on its handling of the crisis and expressed relief that the end appears in sight. Nonetheless, Labor Party leader Foot suggested there would be serious discussion on how the crisis	,
evolvedcontinued	25 X 1

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Comment: //Although Thatcher's statement seems to be more definite on Argentine surrender than some earlier reports concerning the terms of the cease-fire, British authorities clearly expect to take complete control soon. Britain will continue to press for the surrender of both major islands to preclude any Argentine use of West Falkland as a staging base for a counterstrike.//
//If Argentina refuses to surrender both islands, London will almost certainly move swiftly to secure its current position and then mount a military operation to roll up all Argentine military units on West Falkland. As Foot's comment indicates, the postmortem may present Thatcher with her most serious challenge yet in the Falkland crisis.//

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NIGERIA: Oil Revenue Shortfall Nigeria's oil production, although increasing, still is not enough to meet the country's financial needs.	2
//Lower oil revenues and continued high spending forced Nigeria to draw down foreign exchange reserves to \$1.1 billion by the end of Aprilonly 30 percent of the level at the end of 1981.	2
Comment: Nigerian production should continue to rise throughout the third quarter as stock drawdowns come to an end and total demand for OPEC oil increases by 3 to 4 million barrels per day. Even if output rose to the maximum sustainable capacity of 2.2 million barrels per day, Lagos would still have to adhere strictly to recent austerity measures in order to offset the low level of oil revenues in the past few months and keep	2
Wage controls and import restrictions, if effectively enforced, could stir up labor militancy and urban unrest and provide the political opposition with exploitable issues in this preelection year. If significantly higher oil production levels are not forthcoming or if import spending does not fall below the level of last year, Nigeria's current account deficit could reach \$7 billion.	2
	Nigeria's oil production, although increasing, still is not enough to meet the country's financial needs. //Lower oil revenues and continued high spending forced Nigeria to draw down foreign exchange reserves to \$1.1 billion by the end of Aprilonly 30 percent of the level at the end of 1981. Comment: Nigerian production should continue to rise throughout the third quarter as stock drawdowns come to an end and total demand for OPEC oil increases by 3 to 4 million barrels per day. Even if output rose to the maximum sustainable capacity of 2.2 million barrels per day, Lagos would still have to adhere strictly to recent austerity measures in order to offset the low level of oil revenues in the past few months and keep the current account deficit in 1982 manageable. Wage controls and import restrictions, if effectively enforced, could stir up labor militancy and urban urrest and provide the political opposition with exploitable issues in this preelection year. If significantly higher oil production levels are not forthcoming or if import spending does not fall below the level of last year,

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USSR: Grain Harvest Prospects	
//Recent data released in Moscow suggest that, because of poor weather, several million hectares will not be seeded as planned, and the area sown probably is the smallest in a decade. In several regions of the Russian Republic, moreover, temperatures are colder than normal, retarding the development of both winter and spring grains. Important livestock feedgrains will be hardest hit.//	25X
Comment: //These problems may result in another disastrous grain crop. The best the Soviets can hope for is a 200-million-ton grain harvest, which would require near optimal growing conditions for the rest of the season. If there is a further marked deterioration in crop conditionsparticularly in the main spring wheat region, east of the Ural Mountainsthe harvest in 1982 could fall below 185 million tons.//	25X
POLAND: Renewed Disorder	
Demonstrations protesting martial law occurred in three cities on Sunday but were smaller than those in early May. In the southwestern city of Wroclaw, police efforts to disperse a crowd	25X 25X
of 700 provoked a clash that lasted all night. Dozens of police were injured, security force vans were overturned and firebombed, and 96 protesters were arrested. In an industrial suburb of Krakow, police used water cannon and tear gas to break up a march by approximately	207
7,000 young people. Security forces in Gdansk used tear gas to disperse a crowd of about 700 and detained 60 demonstrators.	25X

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MEXICO-US: Payments for F-5s in Arrears

Economic difficulties are causing Mexico to fall behind in payments to the US for the 12 F-5 fighter aircraft it plans to receive before the end of President Lopez Portillo's term in December. The \$100 million contract for the aircraft and support equipment, signed in March 1981, is an important part of the military's modernization effort. Following the peso devaluation earlier this year, however, the Air Force requested that the US reschedule the payments. Despite subsequent trimming of the order and juggling of schedules, Mexico is now \$2.6 million behind in its payments, and it needs to come up with roughly \$10 million by October to keep the deliveries on schedule.

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Comment: Mexico City probably will again seek revisions in the order and the payments, rather than face the possibility that the US will hold back on some of the aircraft scheduled for delivery in October. It is likely to suggest additional cutbacks in the support package and push for more refinancing so that all 12 of the fighters can be delivered by December.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS			
ROMANIA: Ceausescu Ci	racks Down		
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President Ceausescu' and his crackdown on intel critics of his economic potime, but only substantial and avert further disaffectover the lack of Western clooking to the East for he	plicies. This approad reforms might stem t etion. Ceausescu, who concern for Romania's	o intimidate potential ch may succeed for a the economic decline is disappointed	2
Ceausescu frequento prevent challenges goats for policy failubureaucracy. The perslatest in a series of Ceausescu has replaced Secretariat and over h	to his supremacy, ares and to ensure sonnel changes las shifts since earl d two-thirds of th	e a responsive t month are the y 1981 in which se party's executiv	
For the most part aries loyal to the Pre replaced the able and is a party troubleshoo economic management.	esident. Constant experienced Ilie	Verdet as Premier.	2
Dascalescu is lik from government minist in implementing Ceause firing all eight deput appointed four new one economic experience.	escu's economic po Ly prime ministers	y have been lax licies. After , Ceausescu	2
Verdet and former both members of the pa longtime aides of Ceau Romania's economic prothat they had built a a threat at a time when In addition, they may economic policy or ball trary directives.	rty's elite Permansescu, are major soblems. Ceausescu sufficient follows n his own populars have differed with	nent Bureau and scapegoats for may have believed ing to make them ity was at low ebb.	. 2
		continued	
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Economic Problems	
//The underlying cause of Ceausescu's moves is his vulnerability to criticism for failure of his economic development strategy. Growth in the key industrial sector has slowed to the lowest rate since the immediate postwar era. Agricultural output has declined during the past two years and prospects are poor for a turnaround this year.//	25X
//Lack of hard currency to pay foreign debts has forced Romania into debt rescheduling. The slow progress of the rescheduling talks—a final agreement may not be reached until the end of the summer—impedes Romania's ability to finance badly needed imports of energy and other raw materials./	25 X ′
//Consumers bear the burden of the slowdown. Food shortages continue despite substantial jumps in consumer prices and rationing of some key items. Electrical power shortages have resulted in reduced work schedules and layoffs. Bucharest has forced some workers who lost jobs in the cities to return to the farms.//	25X′
//There recently were a few localized strikes over economic grievances. The regime, however, has relied on police repression to prevent a repetition of the violent riots last fall.//	25X′
Turning to the East	
The West's cutoff of credit earlier this year probably convinced Ceausescu to increase Romania's efforts to expand ties with the East. Over the past two years trade with the USSR already had increased 30 percent annually, but Romania still does not receive concessionary terms available to other CEMA members on oil and other important	0514
items.	25 X ′
Ceausescu still distrusts Moscow and refuses to make significant political concessions to obtain economic aid. His talks in February with Italian Communist Party officials during their ideological dispute with the USSR and his recent visit to China testify to his continued pursuit of an independent foreign policy.	, 25 X ′
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As long as he maintains his maverick posture, Ceausescu can expect few substantial benefits from any turn to the East. He may, however, reason that a display of vigilance against Western influences in Romania may evoke some sympathetic response in Moscow. The selection of Romania's former representative to CEMA to oversee the country's foreign trade activities, in place of the more Westernoriented Burtica, may be another gesture to the Soviets.

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Outlook

Ceausescu appears determined to deal with economic problems by administrative tinkering, tightened controls and forced austerity. Continued adherence to this approach, combined with a personnel policy that deemphasizes experience and initiative, will contribute to economic decline, erosion of living conditions and social instability. Popular discontent will continue to simmer, and further impositions of austerity could set off spontaneous disturbances.

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With top officials cowed by the recent purges, chances for serious anti-Ceausescu plotting from within his inner circle are slimmer than ever in the short term. The numbers of prominent victims of Ceausescu's purges continue to grow, however, creating an ever-widening pool of potential foes. Many of them have extensive contacts throughout the demoralized bureaucracy and might find substantial support should they mount a challenge to Ceausescu.

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